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Financial development can exert a significant influence on the distribution of income. In 
this paper, using Chinese provincial data over the period of 1991-2000 and applying the 
generalized method of moment (GMM) techniques, we investigate the relationship 
between finance and inequality in rural China by testing alternative existing theories 
concerning the finance-inequality nexus. A negative and linear relationship between 
finance and inequality is found in our estimations. The empirical results show that 
financial development significantly reduces income inequality in post-reform rural 
China. 
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The Chinese economy has experienced impressive growth over the last two decades. 
However, this rapid economic growth has been accompanied by remarkable increases in 
inequality. According to the official statistics, China’s Gini coefficient rose sharply 
from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.458 in 2000, and China has been among the countries with the 
highest level of inequality in the world (World Bank 1997; Chang 2002).  
Rising inequality in China has received considerable attention recently. Based on macro 
data or household survey data, previous studies on overall, within- and between-group 
inequality in term of income, consumption or other social indicators have provided 
important insights on the evolving pattern of inequality in China (e.g., Rozelle 1994; 
Tsui 1998; Kanbur and Zhang 1999; Gustafsson and Li 2002). However, no research 
work has been conducted to address the role of financial development in the dynamic 
changes of Chinese income distribution. This paper attempts to fill this void by applying 
the recently released provincial data to empirically explore the relationship between 
finance and inequality in China. 
A growing body of literature on finance and income distribution has shown that 
financial development can exert important influence on inequality. However, alternative 
existing theories have made distinct predictions concerning the finance-inequality 
linkage. For instance, in the dynamic model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between finance and inequality is predicted, i.e., 
financial development could widen the income inequality during the early period, but 
then tends to lower it when the average income rises and more households gain access 
to financial intermediaries and services. By contrast, some other theoretical models 
suggest a negative and linear relationship between finance and inequality (e.g., Galor 
and Zeira 1993; Banerjee and Newman 1993), indicating that the development of 
financial market and financial intermediation helps to reduce income inequality. 
Based on a panel data set covering Chinese provinces over the period of 1991-2000, we 
examine the impact of financial development on income inequality in rural China. The 
rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief theoretical 
review on the relationship between finance and income distribution. Section 3 highlights 
the recent trend of income inequality and financial development in rural China. 
Variables and data for regression are described in Section 4. Empirical analyses are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, this paper concludes with Section 6. 
2  Financial development and income distribution: a brief literature review 
Financial development can have important effects on the pattern of income distribution. 
However, two contrasting schools of thoughts concerning the relationship between 
finance and inequality can be generally categorized according to their different 
assumption on the role of financial development in influencing the distribution of 
income. 
The first school of theories suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between finance 
and inequality. In the pioneering work of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) on the 
finance-growth-inequality nexus, two production technologies are assumed to be  
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available in the economy, i.e., a safe technology with constant but relative low return on 
investment, and a more risky one but with higher expected return. In addition, the 
condition of costly entry is introduced into the model by assuming that to enter the 
financial market, a fixed entry cost is charged for financial participation; due to the 
existence of this entry fee, access to the financial sector may be restricted to agents with 
an amount of wealth superior to a certain threshold level. Their model shows that the 
development of financial intermediaries helps to overcome the information friction on 
risky investment through collecting and analysing information on investment projects; 
and it also contributes to smoothing away the idiosyncratic shock through risk 
diversification, trading and pooling.  
Therefore, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) predict that, along with the financial 
intermediary development, the evolution of income inequality follows an inverted 
U-shaped path: in the early stage of development when financial intermediaries are less 
developed, the economy grows slowly; in the intermediate stage of development, 
widening income inequality coincides with more rapid economic growth and more 
deepening financial development; by maturity, when an extensive financial structure is 
fully developed with income level raising and more agents gaining access to the 
financial intermediary sector, the degree of income inequality will decline and 
ultimately become stable in the final stage of development. 
In contrast to the inverted U-shaped relationship predicted in Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990), some other theoretical models suggest a negative and linear relationship 
between financial development and income inequality (e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993; 
Banerjee and Newman 1993). 
Galor and Zeira (1993) model the dynamic evolution of income distribution in an 
economy with indivisibility in human capital investment, where agents live for two 
periods, and generations are linked through the bequests. Agents can either work as 
unskilled labour for both periods, or make an indivisible investment in human capital 
when young in the first period and then work as skilled labour in the second period. 
However, due to financial market imperfections, only agents with sufficiently large 
inheritance will invest in human capital and become skilled labour, while other agents 
will remain unskilled. Therefore, initial wealth distribution matters for the long-run 
level of income, and inequality will be perpetuated through bequests between 
generations. In the long run, there will be a polarization of wealth between high-income 
skilled labourers and low-income unskilled ones: the rich/educated families will 
converge to the high-income steady state, whereas the poor/uneducated ones will 
converge to the low-income steady state.  
Similar predictions can also be found in the model of Banerjee and Newman (1993) that 
concerns the dynamics of wealth distribution with financial market imperfections and 
indivisible investment. In their model, Banerjee and Newman (1993) show that 
opportunity for investment in high-return projects may be restricted to rich individuals 
with wealth larger than a threshold level. More specifically, under imperfect financial 
markets, only agents with wealth in excess of this threshold level may undertake the 
high-return investment while those with inadequate wealth will not. The initial rich will 
become richer through their investment in high-return investment projects; the initial 
poor with no access to credit markets will remain poor. Based on these theoretical 
analyses, a negative and linear relationship between finance and inequality is predicted 
by the second school, in which the development of financial markets and financial  
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intermediaries can help to reduce income inequality through reducing capital market 
imperfections and providing more opportunities for the poor to borrow and then invest 
in high-return projects. 
However, few empirical studies have been conducted to test these alternative theories. 
The recent work of Li, Squire and Zou (1998) and that of Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003) are 
two notable exceptions. Using dataset of Gini coefficients for 40 developed and 
developing countries from 1947 to 1994, Li, Squire and Zou  (1998) examine the 
relationship between financial depth and income inequality. They find that better-
functioning financial markets are strongly associated with lower income inequality. 
Similarly, by employing panel data from both developing and developed countries 
between 1960 and 1995, Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003) analyse the relationship between 
finance and inequality. They find that inequality is lower in countries with better-
developed financial sectors, and that inequality decreases as economies develop their 
financial intermediaries. Therefore, their empirical results provide strong support to the 
linear hypothesis suggested by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman 
(1993), yet they find no evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation between finance and 
inequality as that predicted in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).  
In this paper, using Chinese provincial data, we attempt to test the alternative 
predictions made by different schools of theories concerning the finance-inequality 
linkage. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper looking at the relationship 
between finance and inequality for the case of China. 
3  Financial reforms and income inequality in rural China 
Two decades of rural reforms in China have successfully stimulated rural economic 
growth, and greatly improved the living standards of rural households. Rapid 
development of the rural economy largely altered the pattern of income distribution in 
rural China. Meanwhile, in order to establish a more efficient investment-supporting 
mechanism to meet the financial demands of rural households and to better serve the 
rural sector, a series of policy measures have also been introduced to reform and 
strengthen China’s rural financial system. 
3.1  Reforms in rural financial system 
Before economic reforms, a mono-banking system was formed under the centrally 
planned economy, and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) was the unique financial 
institution in China. However, the traditional financial system failed to provide 
sufficient financial support to meet the needs arising from production expansion in such 
economic sectors as agriculture, industry, construction, transport and commerce.  
The abandon of mono-banking system in the late 1970s marked the beginning of 
China’s financial reform. Four specialized banks, authorized with specialized functions  
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concerning different scopes of economic activities, were separated from the traditional 
system, and the PBC was then reorganized as the Central bank of China.1 
Among the four state-owned specialized banks, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
plays the most important role in serving the rural sector, and acts as the key component 
in China’s rural financial system. Another important financial institution in rural China 
was the rural credit cooperative (RCCs), located at the township and county level, and 
subject to the monitoring of the ABCs. In the 1980s, the focus of reforms on the RCCs 
was to revive its role in collective organization, democratic management and 
administration, and to expand its autonomy in business operations. Since the beginning 
of the 1990s, the government began to accelerate the process of commercializing the 
state-owned banks. To facilitate the transformation of the ABCs into competitive, 
autonomous, and self-accountable commercial banks, the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China (ADBC), i.e., a policy-lending bank responsible for financial loans on 
the purchase and sale of agricultural products, was established in 1994. The 
promulgation of the Commercial Bank Law in 1995 ensured independent operations for 
the commercial banks, which strongly deepened the commercializing reforms of the 
state-owned specialized banks. The process of commercialization was further advanced 
by the separation of the RCCs from the ABCs in 1996, and the RCCs were subject to 
the direct supervision and monitoring of the PBC. Meanwhile, rural cooperative 
foundations (RCFs), created at the beginning of 1980s and organized by local 
governments as informal financial institutions to fill the credit vacuum of formal finance 
in rural sector, have also experienced rapid development during this period. Therefore, a 
multi-institutional financial system was formed in rural China, including the formal 
financial institutions and various types of informal financial organizations. 
However, great changes have recently occurred in the market orientation and operations 
strategy of the ABCs. In order to improve efficiency and profitability, the ABCs began 
to reduce their rural financial business. The focus of the ABCs has been transformed 
from the rural to urban areas; meanwhile, along with the expansion of the ABCs’ credit 
business into non-agricultural sectors, the role of the ABCs in promoting rural 
development has been sharply weakened. As for the other state-owned commercial 
banks, they also gradually withdrew from rural areas. From 1998 to 2002, the state-
owned banks have cancelled or merged more that 30,000 rural financial branches and 
organizations functioning below the prefecture or county level. Moreover, the Chinese 
government and the PBC have recently implemented a series of policy measures to 
control the development of informal finance in rural China; as a result, the RCFs were 
either abolished or merged into the RCCs in 1999. 
Consequently, the RCCs have become the dominant financial institution serving 
China’s rural sector. The ratio of the RCCs’ agriculture loans in total agricultural credits 
has increased rapidly from 26 per cent in 1979 to 54 per cent in 1997, and then to 77 per 
cent in 2001; as for the loans to the township and village enterprises (TVEs), the 
proportion of the RCCs has also expanded from 32.1 per cent in 1979 to 69.5 per cent in 
1997, and to 77.3 per cent in 2001. These results indicate that the monopoly position of 
the RCCs in rural finance has been gradually strengthened over the last several years. 
                                                 
1  The four state-owned specialized banks are the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Construction 
Bank of China (CCB), the Bank of China (BOC) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC).   
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Due to the important role of the RCCs in the rural financial system, the Chinese 
government and the PBC have launched a series of reforms to transform the RCCs into 
viable financial institutions that operate independently, bear risks on their own, and take 
responsibility for their own profits and losses. In addition, policy measures have also 
been advanced to make the RCCs into true cooperatives that better serve their members 
and the rural sector. A pilot programme for further reforming the RCCs has been 
implemented in several areas. Eight counties were selected for a pilot reform project on 
interest rate liberalization within the RCCs, so that RCC deposit rates can float up to 30 
per cent of the official based deposit rate, and their lending rate up to 70 per cent of the 
reference level. In some areas, the RCCs at the township and county level were merged 
into the county financial union, and these in turn would be transformed into rural 
commercial banks according to the shareholding system principle. So far, three rural 
commercial banks have been established in Jiangsu province. In addition, efforts were 
made to organize rural cooperative banks in certain advanced areas, and in 2003, the 
first rural cooperative bank was set up in Zhejiang province. However, to strengthen 
rural financial systems and to promote economic growth in rural areas, foundational 
financial reforms in ownership structure and corporate governance are required in the 
future. 
3.2  Income inequality in rural China 
Along with the rapid economic growth in the rural sector, rising rural income inequality 
has become a noticeable issue of concern in China’s development process. Figure 1  
 
Figure 1 













Source:  Compiled by the author based on NBD data (various years).  
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presents the change of official Gini coefficient for rural China over the last two decades. 
The rural Gini coefficient rose sharply from 0.212 in 1978 to a much higher level of 
0.365 in 2002, an increase by more than 70 per cent during this period.  
Rising inequality has posed a serious challenge to the Chinese government. Increasing 
concern over social equity and social stability has led the authorities to exert greater 
effort to fight inequality. In order to reduce rural inequality, the central government has 
implemented a series of policy measures to support rural development. Such policies 
include prices support for agricultural products; policy aid to stimulate the development 
of rural industry further, especially in the least-developed provinces; and the increase in 
public investment in roads, irrigation, electrification, education, agricultural research 
and development (R&D), and other public services in rural areas. These policies will 
greatly promote production growth, and help to lower income inequality in China’s 
rural areas. 
4  Variables, model and data 
4.1  Variables definitions and measurements 
In this study, we attempt to empirically explore the impact of financial development on 
income inequality in rural China. The logarithm of the provincial rural Gini coefficients 
(GINI) will be employed as the dependent variable in the empirical regressions.2 In 
order to measure the level of financial development in rural China, we construct an 
indicator of rural financial development (FINANCE), defined as the ratio of total rural 
loans to rural GDP. Unfortunately, official data on rural loans and rural GDP are not 
available. To calculate these variables, we first divide the rural sector into two 
subsectors, i.e., the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector. Rural loans are 
then computed as the sum of credit allocated to the agricultural sector and the TVEs 
(township and village enterprises). For the rural GDP, we follow the procedure of Fan et 
al. (2004), in which the GDP of the agricultural sector is equivalent to the GDP of the 
primary sector used by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); and the value-
added for rural industry (including construction) and services is used as a proxy to GDP 
of the non-agricultural sector in rural areas; then rural GDP is computed as the sum of 
GDP for these two subsectors.3  
Another important explanatory variable is the real per capita rural net income (RY, 
expressed in logarithm) at 1985 constant prices. In order to test the inverted U-shaped 
Kuznets hypothesis on the relationship between economic development and income 
inequality, we take into account the squared terms of the logarithm of real per capita 
rural net income (RY
2). 
                                                 
2  China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has annually conducted well-established national 
household surveys covering both rural and urban areas for all regions of the country in the post-reform 
period. These data are ideal for the analysis of China’s evolving pattern of income distribution. 
However, we do not have comprehensive access to these official household survey data. Fortunately, 
based on these rural household surveys, summary statistics for various income intervals of rural 
households are still available at provincial level, and we use these to calculate China’s provincial rural 
Gini coefficients. 
3  Please see Fan et al. (2004) for great detail on this procedure.  
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Given the important role of public investments in rural development, we include the 
variable of government investment in agricultural sector (AGEXP), defined as the ratio 
of government expenditures in agricultural sector to GDP.4 In addition, we also 
introduce in our estimation model the variable of TVEs development (TVED), defined 
as the ratio of employment in the township and village enterprises (TVEs) to the total 
rural labour force.  
4.2 Regression  model 
In general, to test the linear hypothesis  suggested by Galor and Zeira (1993) and 
Banerjee and Newman (1993), we have the following regression model: 
t i i t i t i t i t i X FINANCE GINI GINI , , 2 , 1 1 , 0 , ε μ β β β α + + + + + = −      (1) 
Note that all variables are expressed in logarithm. In this model, GINIi,t is the Gini 
coefficient for province i at year t, FINANCEi,t is the financial indicator, Xi,t is a vector 
of the other control variables. The inclusion of the lag of the Gini coefficient 
 
Table 1 
Definitions of variables  
Variable Definition 
GINI Gini  coefficient 
FINANCE  Rural financial development level, measured by the ratio of total rural loans to rural 
GDP 
RY  Real per capita rural net income 
AGEXP  Government investment in agricultural sector (AGEXP), measured by the ratio of 
government expenditures in agricultural sector to GDP 
TVED  Development level of the township and village enterprises (TVEs), measured by 
the ratio of TVEs employment to the total rural labour force 
Note:   All variables are expressed in logarithm in empirical estimations. 
Table 2 
Description statistics of variables 
 Mean  Std  dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Observations
GINI 0.2751  0.0395  0.1862  0.4009  210 
FINANCE 0.0951  0.0463 0.0104 0.3632  210 
RY 1791.2  1039.9  446.1  5596.4  210 
AGEXP 0.0090  0.0059 0.0021 0.0307  210 
TVED 0.3157  0.1518  0.0531  0.8267  210 
Note:   GINI: Gini coefficient; FINANCE: rural financial development level; RY: real per capita rural net 
income; AGEXP: government investment in agricultural sector; TVED: development level of the 
township and village enterprises. 
                                                 
4  Government expenditures in agricultural sector include the expenditures for supporting agricultural 
production, the investments for comprehensive development of agriculture, and the operating 
expenses of agriculture, forestry, water conservancy and meteorology.  
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(GINIi,t-1) allows us to use the information contained in the initial conditions to generate 
more efficient estimation. In addition, this specification also contains an unobservable 
province-specific effect ui, a constant term α and an error term εi,t. Table 1 presents the 
definitions of variables. Descriptive statistics for all these variables can be found in 
Table 2. 
Similarly, to test the Greenwood-Jovanovic hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between finance and inequality, we introduce a squared term of the 
financial variable (FINANCE
2
i,t) into our estimation, and thus the regression model can 
be rewritten as follows: 
t i i t i t i t i t i t i X FINANCE FINANCE GINI GINI , , 3
2
, 2 , 1 1 , 0 , ε μ β β β β α + + + + + + = −  (2) 
The generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology, proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and then further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is employed here 
to control for endogeneity in our regression model. 
The GMM estimator has been widely employed in recent empirical works, particularly 
in the studies of macroeconomics and finance. This method has a number of advantages. 
For instance, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) argue that the GMM panel estimator is 
good in exploiting the time-series variation in the data, accounting for unobserved 
individual specific effects, allowing for the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as 
regressors, and therefore providing better control for endogeneity of all the explanatory 
variables. Following Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), we use the GMM system 
estimator to investigate the finance-inequality relationship in China. 
4.3 Data 
Our empirical work is based on a panel data set covering 21 Chinese provinces over the 
period of 1991-2000.5 Data used in our empirical test are from China Statistical 
Yearbook  (various issues), China Financial Yearbook (various issues), China Rural 
Statistical Yearbook (various issues), and Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 
on 50 Years of China, individual provincial statistical yearbooks and China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics. 
5 Empirical  results 
Based on the methodology of the GMM system estimator, empirical results are reported 
in Tables 3 and 4. For each regression, we test our specification of equation with the 
Sargan test for instrument validity, and then with the serial correlation test for the 
second order serial correlation. The test results suggest that our instruments are valid, 
and there exists no evidence of second serial correlation in our estimations. 
                                                 
5  Due to the limitation of the Chinese data, computable and complete summary statistics of rural 
household surveys for the calculation of rural Gini coefficient are only available for 21 Chinese 
provinces over the period of 1991-2000. The 21 provinces included in our sample are: Tianjin, Hebei, 
Shanxi, Inter Mongolia, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang.  
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We first test the linear hypothesis that suggests a negative and linear relationship 
between finance and inequality (e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993; Banerjee and Newman 
1993). Empirical results are presented in Table 3. We find that financial development 
significantly reduces income inequality in rural China. The coefficients of FINANCE 
are negative and significant at 1 per cent level in all regressions. According to the 
results in regression model IV, a 1 per cent rise in FINANCE is found to be associated 
with 0.03 per cent decline in rural Gini coefficient, indicating that rural financial 




Financial development and income inequality in rural China 
Test for the linear hypothesis1 
(Dependent variable =  t i GINI , : the logarithm of Gini coefficient)2 
 Regression  I  Regression II  Regression III  Regression IV 
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Per capita Income:        

















Other control variables:        
t i AGEXP,     -0.0316*** 
(-3.83)    -0.0282*** 
(-3.28) 












        
        
Sagan test  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 
AR(2) 0.4061  0.8781  0.5421  0.8572 
Observations 168  168  168  168 
Provinces 21  21  21  21 
Notes:  1  This hypothesis suggests a negative and linear relationship between finance and inequality 
(e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993; Banerjee and Newman 1993); 
  2  All variables are expressed in logarithm. GINI: Gini coefficient; FINANCE: rural financial 
development level; RY: real per capita rural net income; AGEXP: government investment in 
agricultural sector; TVED: development level of the township and village enterprises; 
    ***  significant at the 1% level;  
    **  significant at the 5% level; 
    *  significant at 10% level; for all regressions; 
      T-statistics values are presented in parentheses. 
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Moreover, empirical results show that an increase of government expenditure in 
agricultural sector (AGEXP) helps to lower income inequality in rural areas. The 
variable of AGEXP is negatively and significantly correlated with rural Gini coefficient. 
As shown in regression IV, the elasticity of rural Gini coefficient with respect to 
government expenditure in agricultural sector (AGEXP) is -0.028. In addition, a 
negative and statistically significant impact of TVEs development level (TVED) on 
rural Gini coefficient is also reported in our empirical estimations, which indicates that 
rural inequality will be smaller in provinces with a better development level of the 




Financial development and income inequality in rural China 
Test for the inverted U-shaped hypothesis1 
(Dependent variable =  t i GINI , : the logarithm of Gini coefficient)2 
 Regression  I  Regression II  Regression III  Regression IV 








Financial development:        

















Per capita income:        

















Other control variables:        
t i AGEXP,     -0.0262 
(-1.43)    -0.0200 
(-0.97) 












        
        
Sagan test  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 
AR(2) 0.5404  0.5319  0.2392  0.3036 
Observations 168  168  168  168 
Provinces 21  21  21  21 
Notes:  1  This hypothesis suggests that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
finance and inequality (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990); 
  2  All variables are expressed in logarithm. GINI: Gini coefficient; FINANCE: rural financial 
development level; RY: real per capita rural net income; AGEXP: government investment in 
agricultural sector; TVED: development level of the township and village enterprises; 
***  significant at the 1% level; 
**  significant at the 5% level; 
*   significant at 10% level; for all regressions; 
    T-statistics values are presented in parentheses. 
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Furthermore, in consistent with the insights of Kuznets (1955), our regression results 
suggest an inverted U-shaped relation between economic development and income 
inequality. In all estimations, the coefficients on both the logarithm of real per capita 
rural net income (RY) and its squared term (RY2) are statistically significant in all 
regressions. The positive coefficient of RY and the negative coefficient of RY2 indicate 
the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic development and 
income inequality. 
However, when the squared term of financial indicator is included in the empirical 
estimations to test the non-linear hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between finance and inequality, empirical results show that the coefficients of financial 
squared term are always statistically insignificant and even have the wrong signs 
(Table 4). As such, there is little evidence supporting the inverted U-shaped hypothesis. 
In sum, we find a negative and linear relationship between finance and inequality in 
rural China: rural inequality is lower in Chinese regions with better-developed rural 
financial sectors. Our empirical evident provides strong support to the linear hypothesis 
suggested by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993), but not to the 
inverted U-shaped hypothesis of Greenwood-Jovanovic (1990). This result is also 
consistent with the findings in Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003). 
6 Conclusion 
Theoretical predictions on the finance-inequality nexus are inconclusive and mixed. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
finance and inequality, while a negative and linear relationship is predicted in some 
other theoretical models (e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993; Banerjee and Newman 1993).  
Using Chinese provincial data over the period of 1991-2000 and applying the 
generalized method of moment (GMM) techniques, this study tests the alternative 
hypotheses by investigating the impact of financial development on the distribution of 
income in rural China. 
We find that financial development significantly contributes to the reduction of rural 
income inequality. Our estimation results provide strong support to the linear 
hypothesis, but not to the Greenwood-Jovanovic hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between finance and inequality. 
These findings have important policy implications to China’s economic development. 
To lower China’s rural inequality, further steps have to be taken to strengthen the rural 
financial systems, and effective policy measures should also be taken to accelerate 
financial development in rural areas.  
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